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THE LAW AND 
BLACK FOLK
Katy L. Chiles
Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture 
and the Police Power after Slavery 
by Bryan Wagner. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009. Pp. 307. $37.00 cloth.
Ever since W. E. B. Du Bois pub-
lished The Souls of Black Folk in 
1903, scholars have deliberated over 
what it means to have a soul, to be 
black, or to be part of the folk. In 
Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture 
and the Police Power after Slavery, 
Bryan Wagner gives us a new way 
to consider these issues that is pro-
vocative and, indeed, disturbing. 
Blackness, Wagner claims, is not 
something passed down through 
bloodlines or as a cultural inheri-
tance; rather, it is a certain type of 
statelessness produced when one 
is allowed to exist—but only with-
out standing—in the eyes of the 
state. Furthermore, it is this under-
standing of blackness (one of state-
lessness, not of soulfulness) that 
grounds what we commonly call 
the black vernacular tradition. In-
deed, this version of the black tradi-
tion predicates its own emergence 
on its engagement with the law 
that would construct the existence 
of its practitioners only as one of 
criminality. For Wagner, if we miss 
understanding this aspect of black-
ness, we miss the violence recorded 
in these cultural expressions.
Wagner proposes this alterna-
tive history of the black vernacular 
tradition by debunking some of 
what he calls the central myths of 
its accepted history and by detail-
ing the ethnographic procedure 
that made certain kinds of music 
into folk music (253). He begins by 
showing the way in which the laws 
arising out of a natural law tradition 
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produced a particular notion of 
blackness. For him, the term police 
power refers not just to the formal-
ized institution of law enforcement 
(although it certainly includes that) 
but also more broadly to the power 
of the state to produce certain types 
of subjectivities through the writ-
ing and enforcing of law. Indeed, 
the state’s sovereignty relates to its 
police power, and, in the particular 
case of blackness, the state’s police 
power sees blackness only “for the 
presumed danger it poses to pub-
lic welfare” (6–7). Furthermore, 
this power was not only consoli-
dated in the state itself, as it was 
extended as a “racial privilege of 
all whites over all blacks, slave or 
free” (7). Because this police power 
conceptualized blackness only as a 
threat, it legitimated any effort to 
eliminate that potential threat pre-
emptively before it could culminate 
in action. For Wagner, the black 
vernacular tradition arises out of 
its interaction with this kind of 
legal thinking, and we’d be better 
served by understanding how black 
culture responded to police power 
rather than by misunderstanding 
“the voice’s insistence for a positive 
property such as soulfulness” (21). 
Indeed, as Wagner states,
[M]y aim is to specify the 
historical statement against 
which the black tradition 
has dramatized its own 
emergence. Whether it is ab-
stracted in codes or embedded 
in cases, the law leaves a paper 
trail that can be used to re-
construct the historical coor-
dinates that are invoked in 
the tradition’s representative 
structures of self-address. (21)
One of Wagner’s most power-
ful examples is the history of Uncle 
Remus, the African American 
character created by Joel Chandler 
Harris in Atlanta at the close of the 
nineteenth century. Probably many 
Americans think of Uncle Remus 
either as the storyteller featured in 
Harris’s Uncle Remus, His Songs 
and His Sayings (1880) or as the de-
meaning narrator featured in Dis-
ney’s 1946 film, Song of the South. 
What Wagner reminds us of, how-
ever, is the seriousness with which 
folklorists took the Uncle Remus 
stories for their “scientific worth” 
(116). As Wagner details, Remus 
became structurally important 
both to the study of black folk cul-
ture and to the professionalization 
of that type of study. Remus, then, 
influenced folklorists’ “theories of 
black tradition, in particular those 
theories that would describe the 
tradition as a cultural inheritance 
from Africa;” indeed, he “struc-
tured the archive through which 
the tradition has been imagined” 
(122). By reading through issues of 
the Atlanta Constitution, the news-
paper that initially published Har-
ris’s Remus pieces, Wagner links 
the production of this character 
with the debate simultaneously 
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raging in the newspaper over the 
power of the police. For Atlanta 
to become the “beacon of southern 
enlightenment” (128) that it was 
destined to be and for the South to 
move from the ancient time of slav-
ery into that of the modern world, 
the Constitution argued, its citizens 
must surrender their individual 
rights of violence (even former 
white slaveholders who felt they 
were obliged to administer justice 
on their own plantations) to the 
state. In other words, as Wagner 
explains, to move from living in a 
state of natural warfare (as the nat-
ural law tradition would have it) 
to living in a civilized community, 
white citizens had to abandon “the 
racial entitlement to personal vio-
lence” to the state and its organized 
police units.Abandoning their pre-
sumed rights to administer violence 
as they saw fit, white citizens’ relin-
quishing their right to violence to 
the state did not just bring Atlanta 
into civilization; it also provided 
a convenient and much-needed 
workforce to labor on community 
development projects through 
the brutal convict-leasing system. 
When some citizens were hesitant 
to relinquish their assumed pre-
rogative to violence either because 
they did not trust the lower-class 
men who often served as the police 
or because they had grown accus-
tomed to perpetrating racial vio-
lence themselves, the Constitution 
worked to convince readers that 
they needed the police because the 
black migrants moving into At-
lanta posed “a threat that only the 
police could handle” (138). Thus, 
as Wagner details, this newspa-
per’s discourse helped characterize 
vagrants as threatening criminals 
who the justice system would then 
convict and turn into free labor for 
the city, all the while modernizing 
Atlanta as the civilized center of 
the New South. Black newspapers 
such as the Savannah Tribune were 
quick, of course, to point out how 
the state was profiting materially 
from its judicial practices, and they 
characterized the transfer of power 
from the slaveholder to the nation-
state not as a radical break into the 
modern (as the Constitution would 
have it) but rather as a continuation 
of the “state of war” of slavery that 
was supposed to end, according to 
natural law theory, when the na-
tion-state was established. (This, of 
course, as the Tribune pointed out, 
did not in fact happen because the 
police continued to wage war on 
the black community.)
When Harris then began pub-
lishing Uncle Remus pieces in the 
Constitution, Remus was initially 
not a folk storyteller but rather a 
resident expert on race issues who 
voiced the newspaper’s opinion on 
the need for police power. Thus, 
as Wagner states, “Uncle Remus 
was not merely contiguous to the 
newspaper’s campaign for the 
police—he was part of it” (154). 
Remus spoke out against black 
migrants and for the police; only 
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later did he morph into a planta-
tion storyteller. Wagner, then, reads 
the Remus stories, such as those of 
Brer Rabbit and Brer Fox, in the 
context not only of slave life but 
also of the urban battles occurring 
between the Atlanta police and 
its perceived-as- threatening black 
vagrants. When Remus concurs 
with the police about the neces-
sity of criminalizing vagrants who 
lived without working in formal 
employment situations, these sub-
sistence practices were not only 
“criminalized by the government, 
and pathologized in the Constitu-
tion,” but also “projected into the 
vernacular tradition” (165). Thus, 
within the pages of the Constitu-
tion, Remus’s tales stood both for 
Africa and (with their emphasis 
on wily animals ostensibly needing 
discipline administered from an 
outside authority) for a world that 
Atlanta, with its new police force 
working to control black vagrancy, 
was quickly moving beyond. The 
newspaper, then, “could offer a 
hypothesis about the modern state, 
and it could make the black tradi-
tion into folklore” (168). This is 
problematic enough, of course, but 
for Wagner, even if we can now 
dismiss Uncle Remus as a carica-
ture created by a white folklorist, 
we still have not yet come to terms 
with how Remus (so central to the 
professionalization of folklore and 
to the establishment of blackness as 
a cultural inheritance) structured 
the way that many ethnographers 
have practiced the “collecting” of 
“authentic” black vernacular cul-
ture ever since.
In this riveting chapter, as 
throughout the rest of the book, 
Wagner combines close reading, 
archival research, legal analysis, 
and theorization in a richly inter-
disciplinary project. He is a patient 
writer, revealing aspects of his ar-
gument as they arise, which thus 
rewards patient reading. In his 
other chapters, he analyzes other 
myths about the black vernacular 
tradition, such as songwriter W. C. 
Handy’s account of overhearing a 
black vagrant singing while wait-
ing for a train. Here, Wagner ex-
plains how Handy established the 
measure of vernacular authentic-
ity as a measure of how much the 
singer can embody what he sings. 
Once slavery is abolished, the most 
“authentic” singer of folksongs be-
comes the vagrant who, criminal-
ized by the law, quickly becomes 
the prisoner. This allowed future 
collectors to mistake what Wag-
ner characterizes as “the mne-
monics that enabled informants 
to sing themselves from incapac-
ity into hypothetical existence,” a 
particular kind of stylized artifice, 
for a celebrated “authentic self-
expression” that has continued to 
“orient . . . collectors to their in-
formants” (57). In the case of Bras-
Coupé, a legendary fugitive slave 
who was said to live in the swamps 
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outside of New Orleans, Wagner 
shows how George Washington 
Cable’s removing of Bras-Cou-
pé’s arrest from Place d’Armes to 
Congo Square in The Grandissimes 
(1879–80) not only represses the 
role the police played in Bras-Cou-
pé’s legend (and how the image of 
Bras-Coupé was used by the city 
government to legitimate its use 
of police power) but also contrib-
utes to the mischaracterization of 
Congo Square in the historiogra-
phy of jazz as the birthplace of the 
jazz tradition. Wagner also restores 
the role that police terror played in 
the production of what was taken 
as cultural practice in his examina-
tion of how John and Alan Lomax 
loaded a phonograph into their 
vehicle and took it into penitentia-
ries throughout the South in order 
to record the music produced by 
black prisoners. For Wagner, “[b]y 
proposing that prisoners were the 
last folk singers and prisons were 
the only remaining repositories for 
black authenticity, Lomax trans-
formed the legal imperatives that 
defined black tradition into cultural 
properties” (217). By bringing the 
police power back into view, Wag-
ner helps us to understand how 
the “ethnographic framework” has 
“too often limited the meaning of 
the black tradition” (237).
Wagner is in conversation with 
important scholars likewise inter-
ested in blackness, aesthetics, the 
role of terror, and the history of 
music, such as Fred Moten, Kevin 
Bell, Saidiya Hartman, and Alex 
Weheliye. Wearing his knowledge 
lightly, he also brilliantly draws 
upon and builds on the insights of 
theorists such as Michel Foucault, 
Louis Althusser, Walter Benjamin, 
and Gayatri Spivak. It is clear, for 
instance, how Giorgio Agamben’s 
thinking on sovereignty and on 
the figure of homo sacer has influ-
enced Wagner’s compelling work. 
Indeed, in part because of the vari-
ous conversations that Wagner is in 
and because of the implications of 
his arguments for a number of dif-
ferent fields, readers might want 
to hear more about the theoretical 
implications of Wagner’s trenchant 
argument, particularly for some 
of the axiomatic texts of literary 
criticism. Granted, Wagner states 
early on that his examples are not 
meant to stand in for the entirety 
of the black tradition (22), and he 
does briefly address how Du Bois 
was impacted by and then turned 
away from Joel Chandler Harris’s 
folkloric work. Nevertheless, we 
are still led to ask what Wagner’s 
work might mean for our reading 
of texts like Henry Louis Gates’s 
The Signifying Monkey (1988) and 
the rhetorical mode of signifyin(g). 
African American literary stud-
ies has broadened in so many ways 
from that moment, but, because 
The Signifying Monkey was so foun-
dational, Wagner’s analysis begs the 
question of how we might need to 
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rethink some of the assumptions of 
this important text. I offer this less 
as a critique than as an example of 
how the implications of Wagner’s 
work might be extended even fur-
ther. Overall, this book’s interdisci-
plinary nature and the implications 
of its far-reaching argument for a 
number of disciplines make neces-
sary reading for scholars of history, 
law, music, ethnography, literary 
criticism, and African American 
studies most broadly.
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